SPRINT Robotics comment on proposed U.S. FCC measures affecting robotics

Fri, August 28, 2026

SPRINT Robotics is preparing a comment to the U.S. FCC on proposed measures that may affect robotics, UAS, critical components, and companies doing business in or with the United States. Participants and Associate Participants are invited to provide input on potential impacts and unintended consequences as soon as possible, ahead of the September 2 FCC deadline.

Within SPRINT Robotics, we are examining recent and proposed U.S. regulatory measures that may have significant implications for companies doing business in or with the United States, particularly in relation to robotics, UAS, critical components, equipment authorization, and international supply chains.

On August 27, we held two Input Forum sessions with Participants and Associate Participants to discuss these developments and their potential implications. SPRINT Robotics has also prepared an Information Brief bringing together the relevant developments and source documents. A summary of the Input Forum discussions will be shared shortly.

Several FCC measures have already taken effect, while the FCC is currently seeking public comment on additional proposed changes to its equipment authorization rules by September 2. These proposals address, among other matters, components and software from Covered List entities, supply-chain information, importation, marketing, and equipment authorization requirements.

This comment period provides an opportunity to bring practical consequences and potential unintended effects to the FCC’s attention. Our objective is to avert or minimize side effects affecting our objectives, i.e. achieving large scale use of robotics for inspection, maintenance and operations in capital intensive industry. Such side effects may, for example, occur if systems or components considered military grade, but intended for use in robotic systems for inspection, maintenance and operations in our industries, can no longer be imported and/or used in the US. This may not only apply to robotic systems manufactured outside the US, but would apply to domestically produced systems relying in part on imported components affected by the restrictions proposed. It could therefore also affect other systems than UAS systems, such as humanoids and quadrupeds, if they rely on such critical components.

SPRINT Robotics therefore intends to prepare a comment to be filed in PS Docket No. 26-189 through ECFS, and is asking Participants and Associate Participants to contribute. A submission from an international industry community representing asset owners, technology suppliers, service providers, and other organizations across the robotics value chain can provide a strong and useful industry perspective.

We are now specifically seeking input for PS Docket 26-189, which supports DA 26-758. This was Released 21 July 2026 and Comments close 2 September.

We are seeking two types of input:

  • Input directly aimed at the comment requested by FCC. Please note that FCC is specific about the type of comment they are requesting. For your convenience we have summarized their requests in Appendix A. Please note that it is also possible to submit comment directly to FCC from your organization.
  • Concrete examples of the impact of the proposed measures that will enable us to build a complete picture. They do not need to contain confidential information, and we are not asking organizations to disclose their internal plans or strategies. Please refer to Appendix B for more specific guidance

Please submit your input to us by Monday August 31st COB. You can submit your input by email through: sprintrobotics@sprintrobotics.org. Unless you give us specific permission to mention your company name, we will use your comment only anonymously. Short bullet points are sufficient; the SPRINT team can follow up where additional detail would be useful.

In parallel, SPRINT Robotics will continue to keep the community informed and facilitate the exchange of experiences and ideas. After this immediate FCC comment process, we will also return to the question of how organizations can respond and adapt in practice as the U.S. regulatory environment develops.

Thank you in advance for your contribution.

Appendixes below:

  • Appendix A: What is the FCC is specifically asking commenters to address 
  • Appendix B: Examples of input that would be useful

 

APPENDIX A: What is the FCC is specifically asking commenters to address in DA 26-758:

  • Whether the proposed prohibition is appropriate: Comment on whether the FCC should prohibit the continued importation and marketing of previously authorized, foreign-produced, Covered List UAS and UAS critical components that meet the proposed definition of “military-grade.”
  • Whether the definition of “military-grade” is correct: The FCC specifically asks:
    • Does the proposed list adequately capture military-grade UAS/UAS critical components?
    • Are any listed categories not actually military-grade?
    • Are there military-grade UAS/UAS critical components that are not included in the proposed categories?
  • National security impact: Comment on whether foreign-produced military-grade UAS and components present particularly acute national-security risks, including risks associated with surveillance, sensitive-data exfiltration, supply-chain vulnerabilities, and other threats.
  • Economic and supply-chain impacts: Provide information on how the proposed prohibition would affect:
    • Consumers
    • UAS providers/importers/distributors/retailers
    • Manufacturers
    • The communications sector
    • U.S. supply chains
  • Economic costs and compliance burdens: The FCC specifically requests data and evidence concerning the costs of the proposed prohibition, including whether businesses would incur significant costs when replacing covered equipment with trusted alternatives.
  • Availability of U.S. alternatives: Comment on whether domestically produced alternatives to military-grade foreign-produced UAS and critical components are available and whether replacing foreign equipment with trusted equipment would be cost-effective.
  • Potential economic benefits: Comment on whether the prohibition could stimulate U.S. investment, domestic manufacturing, and job creation, particularly by shifting demand away from foreign-produced military-grade UAS.
  • Public-interest balance: Comment on whether the national-security benefits outweigh negative economic or supply-chain effects and identify any other public-interest considerations that support or oppose the proposed prohibition.
  • Overall balancing evidence: The FCC invites commenters to provide specific information, data, and evidence that would help it balance:
    • National-security risks from continued importation/marketing, against
    • Effects on government partners, consumers, industry, supply chains, and the public.
  • 180-day implementation period: Comment on whether the proposed 180-day phase-out period after Federal Register publication is appropriate.
  • Transition/implementation details: The FCC specifically asks affected parties to address:
    • How many covered devices are already imported and available for sale/marketing or being held for that purpose.
    • How many new or recently updated models are in transit or pending shipment.
    • Devices covered by existing distribution, marketing, or sales agreements that have not yet entered the U.S. supply chain.
    • Any other practical considerations necessary for an orderly transition

 

Appendix B: Examples of input that would be useful

SPRINT Robotics is particularly looking for concrete examples of situations in which the proposed FCC measures could have unintended consequences for U.S. companies, industrial operations, technology availability, or competitiveness.

Examples may include:

Availability of technology for U.S. users

A U.S. asset owner, operator, contractor, or service provider may currently use a foreign-produced UAS, robotic system, or component for inspection, maintenance, or operations. If that equipment can no longer be imported, authorized, replaced, or upgraded, the organization may have to use a more expensive or less capable alternative.

Relevant consequences could include increased inspection or maintenance costs, reduced operational capability, longer shutdowns, reduced availability of specialist technology, or greater reliance on manual work.

Impact on U.S. manufacturers and system integrators

A U.S. manufacturer may rely on imported components, subsystems, communications equipment, sensors, controllers, or other technology incorporated into its own products.

If particular components can no longer be imported or used, the U.S. manufacturer may need to redesign its product, qualify alternative components, change its supply chain, or discontinue an existing product. This could increase costs and development time and reduce the competitiveness of U.S.-manufactured systems.

Testing and evaluation of new technologies

U.S. industrial companies, technology developers, research organizations, and other users regularly evaluate technologies developed elsewhere in the world before deciding whether to adopt or further develop them.

Restrictions that prevent equipment from being brought into the United States for testing, pilots, demonstrations, technology evaluations, or trade shows could make it more difficult for U.S. organizations to identify and assess promising technologies.

Access to international suppliers and service providers

A non-U.S. robotics manufacturer, technology supplier, or specialist service provider may currently supply equipment or perform inspections or other work for customers in the United States.

If the necessary equipment cannot be brought into the country, a U.S. customer may lose access not only to the equipment but also to specialist services or expertise that depend on that equipment. Fewer available suppliers may also reduce competition and increase costs.

Integration of complete robotic systems

Industrial robotic solutions are often assembled from components and subsystems supplied by multiple manufacturers in different countries.

Restrictions affecting individual components could therefore prevent a U.S. manufacturer or integrator from producing or maintaining a complete system, even where the system itself is intended exclusively for civilian industrial inspection, maintenance, or operations.

Safety, workforce, and operational consequences

Robotics and UAS can be particularly valuable where work is hazardous, difficult to access, remote, repetitive, or dependent on scarce specialist personnel.

Reduced access to suitable technologies could therefore mean that U.S. companies need to use more personnel for hazardous tasks, postpone inspections or maintenance, accept lower productivity, or compete for limited specialist labor.

What makes an example particularly useful?

A short description is sufficient. Where possible, please indicate:

  • the type of organization or industrial application involved;
  • the equipment, component, or technology that could be affected;
  • what activity would become difficult or impossible;
  • whether an alternative is readily available;
  • the likely consequence, such as additional cost, delay, redesign, loss of capability, reduced competition, safety implications, or greater labor requirements; and
  • how a U.S. company, U.S. industrial operation, or other U.S. interest would be affected.

Confidential company information is not required. Unless specific permission is provided to identify an organization, examples can be used in the SPRINT Robotics submission on an anonymous basis.